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Opening Up The Suburbs. By Anthony Downs. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. 219. $7.95.
Reviewed by A. Dan Tarlockt
As every American knows, since World War II upper- and middle-
income families have moved into the suburbs and left central city
residences to poorer families.' Cities have lost not only their wealthier
residents; industries also have joined the flight to suburbia. The
shift to truck rather than fixed rail or water transportation and the
construction of the interstate highway system have aided dispersal,
since all parts of a metropolitan area are now suitable for industrial
and residential development. Stripped of wealth and business, many
central city areas have become ghettos of unrelieved poverty and
manifold social problems, with a small sterile core of high-rise
commercial buildings.
The low-income families in the cities need inexpensive, small, and
decent dwelling units.2 Most buildings recently constructed in cen-
tral cities, however, have been offices or high-rise, high-rent apart-
ments. In theory decent city housing vacated by departing suburban-
ites should "trickle" or "filter" down in good condition to low-
income families remaining in the city.3 In actuality as the housing
filters down it inevitably deteriorates and poor housing remains a
familiar problem of the low-income urban family. Nor is housing
readily available in suburbia, for the problem-ridden poor are sys-
tematically excluded.
Suburban governments effect this exclusion by maintaining low
population densities and requiring high construction standards. The
homes that can be constructed are thus far too expensive for low-
income families. 4 Racial prejudice has doubtless played a role in the
exclusionary zoning of the suburbs. 5 But suburban governments pre-
fer to attract only middle- and upper-income families as residents
f Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.
I. See, e.g., E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY 24-32 (1970).
2. See Williams, Doughty & Potter, The Strategy On Exclusionary Zoning: Towards
What Rationale and What Remedy?, 1972 LAND-UsE ANNUAL 177, 180.
3. For a useful collection of papers on filtering see D. MANDELKER & R. MONTGOMERY,
HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERsPEcTIvEs 229-72 (1973).
4. See Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Controls: The Case of North-
eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475 (1971).
5. "The resident of suburbia is concerned not with what but with whom. His
overriding motivation is less economic than social." R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 31
(1966) (emphasis in original).
The Yale Law Journal
for economic reasons as well. Wealthier families pay more taxes0 and
demand fewer government services7 than poorer families, which may
receive welfare payments and certainly send more children to public
school.
Confronting powerful social and economic reasons for the exclu-
sion of low-income groups from the suburbs, Anthony Downs con-
tends that the suburbs can and should be opened up by assigned
risk quotas.5 Downs argues that low-income families ought to be al-
lotted a small percentage of the dwelling units of each suburban
area. He proposes that the number of poor in the central cities in
1970 be cut in half by 1980; this would require construction of
578,000 new subsidized units in suburban areas.9
Downs bases his argument on the assumption that all income groups
desire the benefits of life in the suburbs: decent housing, low crime
rates, and good schools.' 0 He does not believe that urban residential
areas can be revitalized unless many residents move out." He wants
to afford the benefits of suburban life to low-income urban families,
therefore, by effecting a diaspora of the poor into the middle- and
upper-income suburbs.
Downs's premises may be questioned. Some ethnic and racial groups
may prefer life together in urban neighborhoods to suburban ameni-
ties. Moreover, low-income urban groups afflicted with various social
problems may not be able to leave those problems behind when they
become the low-income minority of a high-income suburban neigh-
borhood.
Mr. Downs, however, is a first-rate economist' 2 and a highly suc-
cessful real estate entrepreneur. He is entitled to some credibility
when he contends that the social and economic integration of the
suburbs is possible, that the problems of urban poverty will thereby
6. In 1971-72, 55 percent of the total primary and secondary public school receipts
came from local sources of revenue; 82 percent of this percentage came from property
taxes. R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE 5 (1973). A munici-
pality's dependence on property taxes naturally lends itself to a preference for resi-
dents who own expensive property.
7. Id. at 38.
8. A. DOWNS, OPENING Up THE SUBURBS (1973) [hereinafter cited to page number
only].
9. P. 156.
10. Downs admits that he is a middle-class chauvinist, pp. 97-98, but he contends
that "low- and moderate-income households . . . need to live in neighborhoods where
middle-class influences are dominant in order to achieve their own residential objec-
tives." P. 95. Some low-income families, however, might not want or need to live in
such neighborhoods. P. 110. Moreover, the social problems of this economic and social
integration might be vast and difficult to forecast. Cf. pp. 62-63, 98.
11. P.29.
12. See A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
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be ameliorated, and that the social benefits of suburban life will
not be reduced. Ultimately, however, Downs rests his case on ethical
grounds. Low-income urban families must be admitted to the suburbs,
he argues, because the wealthier suburbanites cannot in conscience
exclude them.
Middle- and upper-income families have employed zoning laws and
housing quality standards and have enjoyed government subsidies
and tax advantages in order to construct for themselves impregnable
belts of amenable living around the nation's cities. Downs contends
that such use of law to deny to poorer families the benefits of subur-
ban living is not conscionable. 13 He argues that opening up the
suburbs would benefit society and even the present suburban resi-
dents. 14 In fact, however, he is frankly asking suburban families to
risk the quality of their life and "make significant sacrifices to benefit
others out of idealism, altruism, or love-not just self-interest."'
To render migration less risky in the eyes of the suburbanites,
Downs suggests that low-income families with serious social problems
or destructive tendencies should not, at least in the initial stages of
the program, be unduly concentrated in any particular suburban
community.' 6 Some bureaucracy, therefore, would have to identify
such families and, presumably, scatter them as far apart as possible
throughout a wide suburban area. This vision is administratively
outlandish and ethically outrageous, but Downs concludes that some
"screening" is necessary to mollify suburban opposition to his pro-
gram.
Downs may be correct in predicting that inclusion of a small
percentage of select low-income families would not threaten the via-
bility17 of suburban life. Nevertheless, his proposal for screened
migration from the ghettos to the suburbs will not win the support
of the political leaders of urban racial and ethnic groups. The dis-
persal into the suburbs of their constituencies will cost them votes.
Nor will housing developers rush to Downs's side; low-income housing
is simply less profitable than more expensive housing for high-income
families.
Downs fails also to take adequate account of the opposition of
13. Pp. 10-11, 166.
14. Pp. 26, 174-78.
15. P. 182.
16. Pp. 111-12.
17. "I define a neighborhood as viable if it would be considered a reasonably de-
cent, safe, and healthful living environment for families with children if judged by
the standards currently held by a majority of Americans." P. 88.
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environmentalists. Low-density zoning helps to bar low-income fami-
lies from suburbs, but it is also a device by which planners attempt
to alleviate the effect of urban sprawl and preserve green space. Those
reciting the litany of environmental benefits derived from low-density
zoning, however, are often guilty of mistaking the varying impor-
tance of these benefits. Some are more in the nature of mere com-
forts and amenities and are not necessary conditions for the "essen-
tial welfare of individuals or . . . the good health of society."'18 Low-
density zoning, for instance, produces housing on large lots, but resi-
dents who profit from such green space number but a few. High-
density zoning by contrast may be employed to create open space,
which people who cannot afford expensive houses are able to enjoy.19
The development plan of the city of Ramapo, New York,2 ' aptly
illustrates the triumph of local environmental concerns over broader
social considerations. 21 Ramapo, directly in the line of the north-
ward expansion of the New York City metropolitan area, decided
in 1966 to preserve its semi-rural character by limiting its population
to 72,000 people. The provision of ample services is guaranteed as
the population grows, because the municipality will not issue a resi-
dential development permit unless the developer plans the construc-
tion of facilities which will supply municipal services to the resi-
dents he intends to house. The Ramapo plan was challenged in
court as an ultra vires exercise by the municipality of nondelegated
legislative power to halt land development and as an unconstitutional
taking. The New York Court of Appeals, 22 while announcing that
it would not tolerate exclusion of new residents, held that the Ram-
apo plan was a "bona fide effort to maximize population density
consistent with orderly growth."2 3 The court did not add the ob-
18. E. BANFIELD, supra note 1, at 10.
19. For a useful survey of planning critiques of low-density development see Sussna,
Residential Densities or a Fool's Paradise, 54 J. LAND ECON. 1 (1973).
20. See generally Bosselman, Can The Town Of Ramapo Pass A Law To Bind The
Rights Of The Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. L. REV. 234 (1973).
21. Those who argue that the concept of "environmental quality" contains within
itself meaningful principles for the resolution of social conflicts have oversimplified
the problems of deriving such principles from the science of ecology. See L.K. CALD-
WELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE TO MODERN SOCIETY (1970), for an example of this
oversimplification.
22. Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972). Ramapo has approximately 200 units of low-income housing, 75 percent of which
are occupied by elderly whites. Bosselman, supra note 20, at 249. Compare Golden
with Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972), in which the court
rejected an attempt to invoke environmental considerations as a means to maintain
large-lot zoning which priced out low- and middle-income families. Accord, Hiram Park
Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d
287 (1st Cir. 1973).
23. 30 N.Y.2d at 378. 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
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vious: The Ramapo timed-development technique is likely to ex-
clude low-income families even more effectively than low-density
zoning does in other areas. Requiring installation of municipal services
before new residents arrive invites expensive housing and expensive
housing together with a limit on the total number of residents in
the town will effectively exclude lower-income families.24
Suburban municipalities, of course, should consider the environ-
mental impact of development and, in some instances, they should
be able to preserve a semi-rural character in the face of population
growth. 25 In some ecologically fragile areas low-density planning
might be absolutely essential. 26 If the only "environmental" benefit
of the Ramapo plan is the preservation of expensive and beautiful
country homes within driving distance of New York, however, Ramapo
cannot in conscience ignore the social problems recited by Downs
in Opening Up The Suburbs.
To implement economic and social integration, Downs proposes
that each metropolitan area be divided into commuting zones-
squares with a diagonal five miles long, 12.5 square miles in area.
Planning would aim to provide, within the 30-minute commuting
time between the zone's most distant points,2 7 decent housing for
a broad range of income classes and employment for those housed.
The integration of income classes is to be tightly controlled: Within
the commuting zone the number of low- and moderate-income house-
holds will be limited so that they do not contribute more than 25
percent of the children attending public school. While the actual
number of low- and moderate-income families might vary from zone
to zone, this schoolchildren limit should guarantee that each zone
retains a solid majority of middle- and upper-income families. 28
Downs believes his plan can be carried out by means of a strategy
24. For a good description of the California "no growth" movement, which might
well emulate the Ramapo plan, see Leary, California, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, No-
vember 1973, at 10. See also Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469
F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1972) (sustaining a six-acre lot minimum size).
25. New Jersey courts, however, have begun to develop the principle that a com-
munity must plan for a balance among types of residential housing. See Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971), certifica-
tion granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1973); Rose, The Court and the Balanced Com-
nunity: Recent Trends in New Jersey Zoning Law, 39 J. AMFa. INsT. PLANNERS 265(1973).
26. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Matarazzo, 120 N.. Super. 164, 293 A.2d 450 (1972); Salamar
Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971).
27. P. 104.
28. Downs considers $8,000 to $15,000 a year to be the earnings of a middle-income
family. P. 8. Low-income families presumably earn less than $8,000; upper income,
more. I take it that a moderate-income family would earn $8,000 to, perhaps, $11,500.
Downs is not specific on these matters.
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which "resembles and takes advantage of free markets. '20 In brief,
he suggests that housing subsidy programs be heavily funded and
that constraints on the construction of inexpensive housing in the
suburbs be lifted.30 Although he favors a decentralized approach for
the present, he believes that planning decisions eventually ought to
be made through institutions whose authority extends to entire metro-
politan areas rather than single isolated suburbs.31
By housing subsidy Downs means "any form of financial assistance
that a government provides to help a household pay for its housing."' 32
He estimates that more than the 25 million Americans officially con-
sidered poor in 1970 would need housing subsidies. Downs realisti-
cally admits, however, that the level of subsidy likely to be appro-
priated in the future will not be high enough to enable low-income
families to move into the suburbs.
Existing subsidy programs have not resulted in a great deal of
dispersal because the suburbs have excluded most subsidized housing
projects and because the Nixon Administration has not pushed for
the authority to override the local zoning ordinances which tend to
exclude such housing. Reformers have identified large lot and mini-
mum house size regulations as important barriers to construction of
low-cost housing in the suburbs. The battle to lift these barriers is
led at the present time by those arguing that large lot and minimum
house size zoning discriminates against a fundamental right to "so-
cial mobility." This alleged right sanctions access to decent subur-
ban housing; zoning regulations, and perhaps construction standards,
which deny access for lower-income groups are thus said to be un-
constitutional.33
Litigation based on this argument has little chance of success, pri-
marily because the existence of a right of access to decent housing
does not imply that the right is infringed by all suburban housing
restrictions. Many of these restrictions are not intended to exclude
the poor but are arguably necessary to insure the "decency" of sub-
urban housing. Excluded families must still pay for the housing. Yet
decent suburban housing is simply beyond the budgets of low-income
29. P. 144.
30. Id.
31. Pp. 150-51.
32. P. 46.
33. It has been suggested that the state affirmatively discriminates against the poor
when its action raises the cost of some resource above what it would be in the private
market. See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. RaV. 1645
(1971). See also Note, Snob Zoning: Must A Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L.
REv. 339 (1970).
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families.34 A right of access to decent suburban housing cannot erase
the cost of that housing; 35 thus low-income families may be said to
be excluded from the suburbs because of a lack of wealth rather
than by affirmative efforts of suburbanites to exclude them.30 A re-
cent study of housing in New Jersey confirms the indications of
earlier studies that minimum house size standards rather than lot
size is the most important variable affecting the cost of housing,
but concludes that "changes in zoning policies making land available
for higher-density single-family units would not be a sufficient con-
dition to generate housing for low- and moderate-income families." 37
The legal attack on exclusionary zoning can only succeed if a court
finds that decent suburban housing must be provided for low-income
families, no matter what the cost. San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez38 is a bad omen for those fighting exclusionary
zoning on constitutional grounds. The Court in that case reasoned
that the Texas system of school finance did not create a suspect
classification: The class of children attending schools in property-
poor school districts was said to be "large, diverse, and amorphous." 30
Analogously, there is no easily definable suspect classification which
includes those families excluded from the suburbs. 40 The Rodriguez
34. The free market price of moving into suburban housing will rarely be within
the budget restraints of urban families who may meaningfully be described as "'poor."
See Bergin, Price Exclusionary Zoning: A Social Analysis, 47 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 1, 34
(1972). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which has never departed from substantive
due process as a basis for judicial control of local zoning, has recently rendered a
series of decisions invalidating large-lot zoning and ordinances totally excluding mul-
tifamily uses. See Appeal of Kit Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh
Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown
Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The court has added equal
protection language to its opinions, stressing the inability of a city which is in the
corridor of growth to deflect growth patterns and the rights of new entrants. The
court, however, has required only that zoning requirements be such that small houses
and garden apartments are feasible-both types of housing which are beyond the means
of low-income families. See Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning and
The Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384, 1432 (1971).
35. Existing studies of suburban housing costs are reviewed in Williams, Doughty &
Potter, supra note 2, at 183-85. The latest study is B. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING
AND HOUSING CoSrs: THE iMPAcr OF LAND USE CONTROLS ON HOUSING PRICE (1973).
36. Of course, it may be possible to prove specific instances of discrimination. See
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), a!f'd,
436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970); cf. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union
City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), where both economic and racial discrimination were
relied upon in holding that a city had a duty to provide land for indigent housing.
Racial discrimination was a factor in the decision, but the relief granted was to in-
digents, not a racial minority. The court was suspicious, however, of the high cor-
relation between economic and racial segregation. See Note, The Responsibility of
Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents, 23 STAN. L. RE'v. 774, 786 (1971).
37. See B. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, supra note 35, at 69.
38. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. Id. at 28.
40. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 786-87 (1969).
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plurality held also that education was not a fundamental interest;4 '
the Court would probably be even less likely to discover a fundamen-
tal right to decent suburban housing.
Not only the Court, but perhaps Downs himself would oppose
the recognition of a right of access, for in principle it would hamper
the creation of his income-integrated suburbs. Downs calls for limi-
tations on the number of public school children from lower-income
families in each commuting zone, and he asks for screening to pre-
vent the concentration in single suburban communities of families
with multiple problems. A right of access, however, could presumably
be invoked by any number of low-income families, no matter how
many children or how many problems they had. No principled limi-
tation is readily apparent, but without some qualification of the
right of access Downs's proposals could not be implemented.
If constitutional law fails to open the suburbs, the Downs plan
will have to be implemented by metropolitan-wide governmental
authorities. Municipalities can be seen either as sovereignties en-
titled to regulate diverse local matters or as producers of a limited
range of goods and services for a small, localized market. The former
model presupposes a nation of small, self-contained units, whose plans
respond only to local needs. But local plans have substantial, albeit
usually unintended, effects on far wider geographical areas. Reality is
reflected more accurately by a conception of municipalities as pro-
ducers of limited goods and services, competing among themselves
for residents by offering low-priced, high-quality products. 42 Such
a model would reveal that no single suburban community can ab-
sorb all the costs of social and economic integration. A hypothetical
volunteer community would probably be unable to pay for the new
services required by recently arrived poor families; certainly it would
suffer in the competition for high-income families. The Downs plan
can only be carried out, therefore, on an area-wide basis, with eco-
nomic and social costs borne equally by all communities in the
area.
43
The present method for allocating the social and economic costs
of development is local zoning. Implemented in New York City in
41. 411 U.S. at 29-39. justice Powell did stress, however, that the Texas educational
system was an attempt to improve the quality of education everywhere in the state; the
lack of good intentions behind local zoning, however, might make it more vulnerable
to constitutional challenge.
42. See Ellickson, Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice, 196 Am.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 334 (1971).
43. See Babcock, Sanborton &- Morales, Two Faces Of The "Environment," 2 EN-
VIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 758 (1973).
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1916 and championed across the country by then Secretary of Com-
merce Herbert Hoover,44 zoning was supposed to be first, a substi-
tute for costly and complex private covenant schemes and second,
a means by which an activity could be classified as a nuisance without
litigation. Applied to undeveloped land, however, zoning functions
not to protect the value of extant uses but instead to assign values
to hitherto unused land. Zoning has thus made some developers
wealthy, but it has proved unable to shape new communities satis-
factorily.45 It can shape the social composition of an area only very
crudely; and whereas low-density zoning may usually attract white,
high-income families, high-density zoning alone cannot guarantee
social and economic integration.
New, broad-based government authority is necessary to carry out
Downs's programs. Most proposals for such authority invoke its neces-
sity only when local decisions have substantial external effects on
an entire area.46 Some have suggested, however, that cities could be
treated as agencies charged with the implementation of regional
plans.47 A state or regional governmental body, armed with authority
to regulate the flow of subsidies to participating low-income families
and local communities, thus could map a plan of dispersal and au-
thorize cities to carry out the design.
There is a need not only for new methods of administering land
use allocation, but also for a reexamination of the basic planning
concepts which underlie development doctrine. Most plans for the
control of development, for instance, encourage compaction of hous-
ing so that public services may be easily located near all housing
units and open space may be preserved. Low-density zoning, of course,
encourages costly single-family homes, while compaction might seem
to permit less costly multi-family housing. But high-density zoning
drives land prices in the areas designated for development so high
that "the housing that is built is out of the reach of lower income
families, even under the present subsidy system." 48 Perhaps future
44. See generally S. TOLL, ZONED AERICAN (1969).
45. See 'generally D. MfANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA: A LEGAL STRATEGY FOR
URBAN CHANGE (1970).
46. See ALI Model Land Development Code §§ 7-201, 7-301, 7-401 (Tent. Draft No.
3, 1971). Legislation modeled after the ALI code has been adopted in Florida. Florida
Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012 et seq.
(Supp. 1973-74). See also Bosselman, supra note 20, at 257-65.
47. See generally Mandelker, The Role of Zoning in Housing and Metropolitan
Development, in PAPERS SUBMITrED TO SUBCOMM. ON HOUSING, PANEL ON HOUSING PRO-
DUGTION, HoUsING DEMAND AND DEVELOPING A SUITABLE LIVING ENVIRONMENT, PART 2,
HOUSE CO M. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 92D CONG., lsT Sass. 785 (1971).
48. See id. at 793.
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subsidies will have to reflect the increased land costs likely to be the
consequence of higher-density zoning. Or perhaps the suburbs might
more efficiently be opened by permitting low-density housing and
subsidizing the purchase of single-family homes by lower-income
groups. In any event an area-wide government committed to achiev-
ing the economic and social integration urged by Downs will have
to grapple with such problems.49
Redefinition of land use purposes and reassignment of governmen-
tal authority are two tasks for legislatures. Courts, however, can spur
reconsideration of existing methods of land use control by exercis-
ing increased judicial review of present planning decisions. Michi-
gan's highest court has properly shifted the burden of justification
to the community when its plan totally excludes some use.50 The
Oregon Supreme Court has gone further and held that there is no
presumption of validity to any zoning map amendment.51 Close
judicial scrutiny of planning decisions should mean that a zoning
authority's denial of a use has to be supported by proof that (1) the
development would impose substantial costs on the surrounding com-
munity or property; (2) that the costs to the community cannot be
minimized by stricter construction and design standards; and (3) that
the use cannot be permitted elsewhere in the community, consistent
with the regional plan.52 Requiring such a showing would facilitate
developers' efforts to respond to the housing needs required by the
Downs plan. These standards would permit, however, a plan such
as Ramapo's if it were part of or consistent with a regional plan.
In the absence of such a showing a court might well adopt the pre-
sumption that techniques such as the Ramapo timing ordinance are
not authorized by existing legislation.
The role of the judiciary in opening up the suburbs cannot be
great. Nor can a regional decisionmaking authority armed with the
power to allocate subsidies necessarily achieve Downs's goals of eco-
nomic and social integration in the suburbs. Downs has argued that
49. See R. BABCOCK, supra note 5, at 115-37.
50. See Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 211, 192 N.W.2d 322,
325 (1971). Technically, Bristow does not shift the burden of proof but only the burden
of going forward. See Binkowski v. Township of Shelby, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 N.W.2d
243 (1973).
51. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Ore. 1973).
52. The assumption here is that communities can best accomplish the dual ob-
jectives of protecting environmental quality and providing a broad assortment of types
of housing by passing ordinances which allow discretionary review on a case by case
basis of projects which are proposed. While undertaking such a review procedure com-
munities may also encourage large-scale multi-unit developments. THE USE OF LAND:
A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 189-99, 246-61 (V. Reilly ed. 1973).
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the suburbs must be opened lest we perpetuate a divided, inequitous,
and frightened society. He has addressed himself primarily to the
denizens of suburbia. Ultimately only their willingness to respond to
the social obligations recited by Downs can guarantee success of his
program. One may hope, along with Downs, that those who live in
the closest existing approximations of the American Dream will be
willing to risk what they have built for themselves in the hopes of
the achievement of a way of living better for everyone.
Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal. By
Ward S. Bowman, Jr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
Pp. xii, 272. 510.50 (clothbound).
Reviewed by Oliver E. Williamsont
Ward Bowman's analysis of restrictive patent licensing and, for
that matter, of vertical market restrictions generally, reasserts a po-
sition that both he and Robert Bork have taken previously; namely,
vertical market restrictions usually, virtually always, have beneficial
efficiency consequences and ought to be regarded as lawful. The
argument relies heavily on two propositions: (1) vertical market
relations can never create monopoly power (the so-called "scope"
problem); and (2) mobilizing latent monopoly power yields allocative
efficiency gains.
While I concede that both of these propositions hold in many and
perhaps most circumstances, neither holds without qualification. Both
occasionally fail to take account of transaction cost considerations.
Such costs have been persistently neglected by critics and supporters
of the Bowman position alike. This neglect has impeded an accurate
assessment of the effects of vertical market restrictions and has played
into the hands of those who assert that such restrictions are in-
variably innocent or beneficial.
Transaction costs can be disregarded, of course, in circumstances
where they can plausibly be held to be negligible. It is incautious,
t Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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